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I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 17, 2012, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie signed 
into law a resolution that would permit betting on sports at New 
Jersey casinos and racetracks.1 This action contravened a federal law, 
the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 
(“PASPA”), which presently forbids the states from allowing legal 
sports betting, with four specific exceptions.2 Although wagering on 
sports is prohibited in 46 states, studies have estimated that as much 
as $380 billion changes hands per year in the United States as a result 
of illegal betting.3 This number is over one hundred times the 
amount wagered legally at Nevada sports books in 2011.4 Because 
states like New Jersey desire to turn this illegal activity into taxable 
business transactions, PASPA has not existed without controversy. In 
2009, Delaware passed a law that would have expanded the types of 
sports wagering activity permitted within its borders, and in both 
2007 and 2011 private citizens (in the latter case, New Jersey state 
legislators) sued to have PASPA declared unconstitutional.5 Presently, 
five major athletic organizations have brought suit to enjoin the 
implementation of the New Jersey plan to permit sports betting, 
claiming that legalized sports betting in New Jersey would threaten 
the integrity of the athletic contests they oversee.6 Given that New 
 
1  Wayne Parry, Christie Signs Sports Betting Bill Into Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 17, 
2012, http://www.profootballweekly.com/2012/01/17/christie-signs-nj-sports-
betting-bill-into-law. 
2  Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704 
(1992); see also id. at § 3704 (creating exceptions that specifically apply to the pre-
existing betting practices in the states of Delaware, Montana, Nevada, and Oregon, as 
well as for “pari-mutuel animal racing or jai alai games.” § 3704  also opened a one-
year window in which New Jersey could pass a law qualifying it for an exemption of its 
own). 
3  NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N REPORT 2-14 (1999) available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/finrpt.html. 
4  Sports Wagering Fact Sheet, AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.americangaming.org/industry-resources/research/fact-sheets/sports-
wagering (last visited Oct. 1, 2012). 
5  Interactive Media Entm’t and Gaming Ass’n, Inc. v. Holder, Civil Action No. 
09-1301, 2011 WL 802106, at *5-6 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2011) (discussing OFC Comm 
Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2009) and Flagler v. U.S. Attorney for the 
Dist. of N. J., Civ. No. 06-3699, 2007 WL 2814657, at *2-3 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2007)). 
6  See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, No. CV124947, 2012 WL 3171566, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 
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Jersey’s law violates PASPA on its face, the only viable defense the 
state has is to attack the constitutionality of the federal law. 
Importantly, none of the previous three suits involving PASPA 
reached any constitutional arguments.7 Yet, even if New Jersey’s 
constitutional challenge is not viable, there are numerous policy 
reasons why a repeal of PASPA should be explored. 
Part II of this Note is an overview of the history of the 
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act and related 
litigation, including the ongoing lawsuit involving the state of New 
Jersey. Part III walks through the constitutional arguments made in 
New Jersey’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and those 
arguments made again on appeal— arguments that were adopted in 
a dissenting opinion by Judge Vanaskie of the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit. In Part IV, this Note explores a number of policy 
arguments against PASPA’s blanket prohibition, as well as a number 
of game-fixing and point-shaving scandals that are often cited in 
support of banning sports betting. Finally, Part V makes the policy 
argument that even if New Jersey’s constitutional challenges lack 
merit, PASPA should be revisited in light of this challenge because of 
the positive effects a repeal or revision are likely to have on gambling 
enforcement, as well as on New Jersey’s economy. 
II. OVERVIEW OF PASPA 
A. Legislative History 
On February 22, 1991, Senator Dennis DeConcini of Arizona 
introduced S. 474, the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection 
Act, which would prohibit sports gambling throughout the United 
 
2012) (complaint on behalf of Major League Baseball, the National Basketball 
Association, the National Collegiate Athletic Association, the National Football 
League, and the National Hockey League). 
7  See generally Interactive Media Entm’t and Gaming Ass’n , 2011 WL 802106 
(holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue); OFC Comm Baseball, 579 F.3d 293 
(holding that the statute should be construed narrowly to limit Delaware to forms of 
gambling precisely as they existed at the time of the passage of PASPA); Flagler, 2007 
WL 2814657 (holding that plaintiff lacked standing to sue). 
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States in locations where it did not already exist.8 DeConcini asserted 
that the activities he sought to ban “threaten[] the integrity and 
character of, and public confidence in, professional and amateur 
sports, and instill[] inappropriate values in our Nation’s youth.”9 As 
the bill passed through committee and moved closer to passage, a 
number of legislators spoke out against it, notably Frank Lautenberg 
of New Jersey.10 Senator Lautenberg expressed concern that the 
format of the bill, creating an exception by which Nevada could 
permit sports betting at its casinos, would cause serious harm to the 
Atlantic City, New Jersey casino industry.11 Senator Lautenberg’s 
criticism was undercut, however, by the passionate support the bill 
received from his fellow New Jersey senator, Bill Bradley.12 As a 
former professional basketball player, Senator Bradley’s credibility in 
opposing legalized sports betting was apparently unassailable.13 As a 
champion of PASPA, Bradley seriously damaged any chance New 
Jersey had of formulating a legitimate narrative of discrimination.14 
President George H.W. Bush signed PASPA into law on October 
28, 1992.15 Thanks to the exceptions contained in § 3703, New Jersey 
had the opportunity to pass a law permitting sports betting within 
one year of the date PASPA became law.16 As a result of the political 
infighting in the state legislature, as well as the lack of support from 
Senator Bradley, New Jersey did not pass such a law.17 
 
8  137 CONG. REC. S2,256-04 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dennis 
DeConcini). 
9  Id. 
10  138 CONG. REC. S7,300-01 (daily ed. June 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Frank 
Lautenberg). 
11  Id. 
12  See generally Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act-
Policy Concerns Behind Senate Bill 474, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5 (1992) (arguing 
vehemently for the passage of PASPA). 
13  Joseph F. Sullivan, Gambling Debate Rages Anew Over Sports, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 
1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/20/nyregion/gambling-debate-rages-anew-
over-sports.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
14  Id. 
15  138 CONG. REC. S18,332-01 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1992) (statement of Sen. Dennis 
DeConcini). 
16  28 U.S.C.A. § 3703 (West 1992). 
17  Joseph F. Sullivan, Judges in Trenton Reject Sports Betting Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
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B. Prior Litigation 
On August 7, 2006, James Flagler, a private citizen of New Jersey, 
filed suit against then-U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and 
Chris Christie, then the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey, 
alleging that PASPA violates the 10th Amendment and is beyond the 
reach of the Commerce Power.18 The district court ruled that the 
plaintiff did not satisfy constitutional or prudential standing 
requirements.19 Specifically, the court found that Mr. Flagler failed to 
demonstrate that the federal prohibition on sports wagering activities 
represented an “injury-in-fact,” as well as that a favorable disposition 
on the case would have adequately redressed his perceived injuries.20 
Thus, although the challenge failed, the district court did not 
establish any precedent regarding PASPA’s constitutionality. 
On May 14, 2009, Delaware Governor Jack Markell signed a law 
that would permit “point spread bets . . . over/under bets . . . and . . . 
multi-game parlay bets.”21 Following a request from Governor 
Markell, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled in an advisory opinion 
on May 29, 2009, that the legislation did not violate state law.22 The 
same five entities that are plaintiffs in the ongoing New Jersey suit 
sought an injunction against the Delaware plan.23 The U.S. District 
Court for the District of Delaware denied the injunction and the 
leagues were granted an interlocutory appeal to the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals.24 In Markell, the Third Circuit’s analysis focused on 
the language of PASPA outlining the exception under which 
Delaware had qualified.25 The opinion turns on the interpretation of 
a single phrase: “to the extent that the scheme was conducted by that 
State.”26 Delaware interpreted this phrase to mean that since it had 
 
18, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/18/nyregion/judges-in-trenton-reject-
sports-betting-plan.html?pagewanted=2&src=pm. 
18  Flagler, 2007 WL 2814657, at *1. 
19  Id., at *2. 
20  Id., at *2, *3. 
21  Markell, 579 F.3d at 295. 
22  Id. at 295-96. 
23  Id. at 295. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. at 300-04. 
26  Id. at 301 (emphasis in original). 
NOTE_MIERSWA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/25/2014  10:43 AM 
2014] BATTLE TO LEGALIZE SPORTS BETTING 453 
 
conducted some form of sports betting, it remained eligible to 
conduct any other form of sports betting.27 The majority sided with 
the leagues’ interpretation, that the inclusion of such a phrase within 
the statute exhibited Congress’ intent to limit Delaware to precisely 
the scheme that existed at the time of the passage of PASPA.28 The 
constitutionality of PASPA was never raised by Governor Markell, nor 
addressed by the court.29 
On March 7, 2011, New Jersey State Senators Raymond Lesniak 
and Stephen Sweeney, in conjunction with three New Jersey 
Horsemen’s Associations and iMEGA, a group that publicizes 
internet gambling, brought suit against Attorney General Eric Holder 
and Paul Fishman, U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey, 
challenging the constitutionality of PASPA.30 The plaintiffs alleged 
nine counts in which Congress exceeded its constitutionally 
delegated authority in enacting PASPA.31 The district court found 
that iMEGA and the Horsemen’s Associations did not meet the 
injury-in-fact or redressability requirements to have standing in the 
case.32 The court also held that Senators Sweeney and Lesniak failed 
to satisfy the injury in fact and redressability requirements, as well as 
the requirements to achieve “institutional standing” under Coleman v. 
Miller.33 Finally, the court concluded that only states— rather than 
private individuals— have the requisite standing to make Tenth 
Amendment challenges.34 
C. History of the New Jersey Law 
On Election Day 2011, New Jersey voters supported by a nearly 
two-to-one margin a non-binding referendum that suggested 
 
27  Markell, 579 F.3d at 301. 
28  Id. 
29  iMEGA v. Holder, No. 09CV01301, 2011 WL 802106, at *5 n.2 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 
2011). 
30  Id. at *1. 
31  See generally Complaint and Demand for Declaratory Relief, iMEGA v. Holder, 
No. 09CV01301, 2009 WL 4890878, *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2009). 
32  iMEGA, 2011 WL 802106, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2011). 
33  iMEGA, 2011 WL 802106, at *6, *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2011) (citing Coleman v. 
Miller 307 U.S. 433 (1939)). 
34  Id. at *8, *9. 
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permitting sports betting at Atlantic City casinos, the racetracks at 
Monmouth Park, The Meadowlands, Freehold Raceway, the Atlantic 
City Race Course, and a former track in Cherry Hill.35 In the face of 
such overwhelming support, an amendment to the New Jersey State 
Constitution was passed, establishing the constitutionality of a future 
law permitting sports betting.36 On November 21, 2011, Senator 
Raymond Lesniak introduced a bill in the New Jersey State Senate 
“permit[ting] wagering at casinos and racetracks on certain 
professional and collegiate sports or athletics events.”37 One week 
later, on November 28, Assemblyman John Burzichelli sponsored an 
identical version of Lesniak’s bill.38 In the statement accompanying 
the initial drafts, legislators established tax rates to be paid by casinos 
and racetracks on future sports book income, as well as the 
conditions that would apply to the state’s newfound tax revenues.39 
The bulk of tax revenues paid to the state will fund programs for 
senior citizens and individuals with disabilities.40 A small percentage 
will fund community and economic development projects 
throughout the state and a percentage of the registration fee paid by 
the casinos and racetracks will fund treatment programs for 
compulsive gamblers.41 
The bill went through two revisions in the New Jersey State 
Assembly, the more notable of the two eliminating the ability of 
patrons to place bets with licensed entities through use of the 
internet or other electronic devices.42 The Assembly bill replaced its 
Senate counterpart as the final version on January 9, 2012, and 
passed by a unanimous vote on the same day.43 On January 17, 2012, 
 
35  Wayne Parry, NJ voters: We want to bet on sports if US says yes, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9QT8KIG0.htm. 
36  N.J. Const., Art. IV, § 7, para. 2 (amended Dec. 8, 2011). 
37  S. 3113, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2011). 
38  A.B. 4385, 214th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2011). 
39  A.B. 4385, 214th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. Nov. 28, 2011). 
40  Id. 
41  Id. 
42  A.B. 4385, 214th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. Jan. 17, 2012) (omissions from §§ 
2(d), (e)). 
43  Permits Wagering at Casinos and Racetracks on Certain Professional and 
Collegiate Sports or Athletic Events, A.B. 4385, 2010-11 Sess. (N.J. 2010), replaced by 
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Governor Chris Christie signed the final version of the bill into law, 
officially defying PASPA.44 In public statements, Assemblyman 
Burzichelli explained that “sports gaming is already taking place, but 
the only people taking advantage of it are bookies and criminal 
enterprises. This opens the door for New Jersey to implement well-
regulated sports gambling.”45 In an attempt to aid New Jersey’s efforts 
to make legalized sports wagering a reality, Congressmen Frank 
Pallone, Jr. and Frank LoBiondo introduced two bills in the U.S. 
House of Representatives, one that would exempt New Jersey from 
PASPA and another that would grant all states a four year-window— 
terminating on January 1, 2016— in which to pass laws legalizing 
sports betting.46 Both bills were assigned to committee on January 23, 
2012, and as of this writing both have yet to be reported out of 
committee.47 
D. Sports Leagues Seek to Enjoin New Jersey Law 
On August 7, 2012, the National Basketball Association, the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association, the National Football 
League, the National Hockey League, and Major League Baseball 
filed suit to enjoin the implementation of the New Jersey Law.48 The 
plaintiffs allege a single injury, specifically that New Jersey’s law 
violates PASPA.49 The leagues base their claim of injury on the 
assertion that if wagering on the outcomes of their games is 
 
S.B. 3113 on Jan. 9, 2012, available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillsByNumber.asp. 
44  Wayne Parry, Christie Signs Sports Betting Bill Into Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(January 17, 2012), http://www.profootballweekly.com/2012/01/17/christie-signs-
nj-sports-betting-bill-into-law. 
45  Burzichelli, Wagner & Caputo Bill To Position New Jersey To Implement Well-
Regulated Sports Gaming Signed Into Law, TARGETED NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 17, 2012 
(Lexis). 
46  Press Release, Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr., Pallone and LoBiondo Team Up to 
Bring Sports Gaming to New Jersey (Apr. 26, 2012) (Lexis). 
47  H.R. 3797: Sports Gaming Opportunity Act of 2012, GOVTRACK, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr3797 (last visited Oct. 23, 2012); H.R. 
3809: New Jersey Betting and Equal Treatment Act of 2012, GOVTRACK, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr3809 (last visited Oct. 23, 2012). 
48  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n v. Christie, No. CV124947, 2012 WL 3171566, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2012). 
49  Id. at ¶ 32. 
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permitted “[their] reputation and goodwill will be irreparably 
damaged . . . including but not limited to the fact that the 
proliferation of sports gambling will adversely affect the way that the 
public views amateur and professional sports.”50 The suit seeks 
declarations that the law and the as-yet-unwritten regulations violate 
federal law, and an injunction preventing the implementation of 
both.51 
Days later, on August 10, the plaintiffs moved for summary 
judgment and alternatively a preliminary injunction “to preserve the 
status quo pending a final decision on the merits of their claim.”52 
The leagues assert that they are entitled to summary judgment 
because the New Jersey law explicitly violates PASPA.53 Further, the 
leagues assert that PASPA does not violate the Commerce Power, the 
Equal Protection Clause, or the Tenth Amendment, and they seek to 
permanently enjoin New Jersey from implementing its law.54 
Alternatively, the leagues seek to enjoin implementation of the law to 
preserve the status quo until a decision is reached on the merits of 
the lawsuit.55 
The state of New Jersey filed its response on September 7, 2012, 
in the form of a motion to dismiss the suit for lack of standing.56 The 
state asserted that the leagues failed to allege a sufficient “injury-in-
fact” as required by the U.S. Constitution.57 Further, the state argued 
that the claimed injury was not “fairly traceable” to the law in 
question.58 New Jersey also contended that Congress, while creating a 
 
50  Id. at ¶ 34. 
51  Id. at ¶ 35. 
52  Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and, If 
Necessary, to Preserve the Status Quo, a Preliminary Injunction, Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, No. 12-cv-04947, 2012 WL 3964728, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 
2012). 
53  Id. 
54  See id. 
55  Id. 
56  Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FED R. CIV. P. 
12(b)(1), Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, No. 3:12-cv-04947, 2012 WL 
3964552, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 7, 2012). 
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
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private right of action, may not lower the threshold for standing 
beneath the “floor” that exists pursuant to Article III.59 
On October 15, 2012, New Jersey published final regulations for 
sports betting that permit the New Jersey Division of Gaming 
Enforcement to accept license applications and grant licenses as soon 
as January 9, 2013.60 U.S. District Judge Michael Shipp heard oral 
arguments on the standing issue on December 18, 2012.61  Judge 
Shipp ruled that the leagues do in fact have standing to sue by 
meeting all three requirements, and a subsequent round of oral 
arguments on dueling motions for summary judgment took place on 
February 14, 2013.62 On February 1, 2013, the U.S. Department of 
Justice joined the suit and filed a brief in support of the 
constitutionality of PASPA.63 On February 28, 2013, Judge Shipp 
granted the sports leagues’ motion for summary judgment, declaring 
that PASPA is in fact constitutional.64 New Jersey took an expedited 
appeal to the Third Circuit.65 The Third Circuit affirmed, but one 
member of the panel accepted New Jersey’s arguments that PASPA 
does not legislate evenly amongst the several states.66 
III. NEW JERSEY’S CLAIMS THAT PASPA IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
New Jersey’s initial cross-motion for summary judgment 
pointedly challenged the standing of the plaintiffs and raised a 
 
59  Id. 
60  Donald Wittkowski, Final regulation approved for sports betting in New Jersey, THE 
PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, Oct. 16, 2012 (Lexis). 
61  Hoa Nguyen, Lawyers involved in sports betting mandated to appear in Trenton, THE 
PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, Oct. 23, 2012 (Lexis). 
62  Brent Johnson, U.S. justice department dismisses N.J.’s claim that sports betting ban is 
unconstitutional, THE STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 2, 2013, 
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/02/us_justice_department_dismisse.ht
ml. 
63  Id. 
64  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, No. 12-4947, 2013 WL 772679 
(D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2013). 
65  Christopher Baxter, Christie administration files notice of appeal in federal sports 
betting case, THE STAR-LEDGER (March 13, 2013), 
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/03/christie_administration_files.html. 
66  NCAA v. Christie, 730 F.3d 208, 241 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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number of constitutional arguments against PASPA.67 New Jersey 
asserted three arguments: (1) that PASPA violates the Tenth 
Amendment, (2) that PASPA exceeds Congress’ Commerce Power, 
and (3) that PASPA deprives the 46 states not exempted by PASPA of 
both due process and equal protection.68 Judge Shipp denied New 
Jersey’s motion, and the Third Circuit affirmed his decision; but since 
one of three Third Circuit judges who heard the case agreed with 
pieces of New Jersey’s argument for PASPA’s unconstitutionality, and 
other states have commenced the process to potentially pass laws 
similar to that of New Jersey’s, it is reasonable to presume that the 
Supreme Court will address each argument in this case at some point 
in the future. 
A. Tenth Amendment 
The language of the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress 
from intruding on areas reserved for the states.69 During the 
legislative process that created PASPA, Senator Chuck Grassley voiced 
his concerns that PASPA intruded upon an area traditionally reserved 
to the states.70 Grassley argued— accurately— that the regulation of 
lotteries and casino gaming has traditionally been a state concern, 
and asserted that it would be a serious overreach for the federal 
government to tell the states how they may or may not raise revenue.71 
Thus far, opponents of PASPA have found it difficult to mount a 
challenge on Tenth Amendment grounds because of the difficulties 
of establishing standing— the reason why the challenges in both 
Flagler and iMEGA failed without reaching the merits.72 In the instant 
case, however, the parties challenging PASPA are the defendants, 
eliminating that procedural hurdle.73 
 
67  Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, NCAA v. 
Christie, No. 3:12-cv-04947, 2012 WL 6020639, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2012). 
68  Id. at II(A-C). 
69  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
70  S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 12 (1992). 
71  Id. 
72  See discussion of Flagler and iMEGA, supra Part I. 
73  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, No. CV124947, 2012 WL 3171566, at 
*1 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2012). 
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New Jersey argues that the plain language of PASPA violates the 
“anti-commandeering” principle protected by the Tenth Amendment 
and established in New York v. United States.74  Since New Jersey law 
permits sports wagering to be conducted by licensed casinos and 
racetracks,  PASPA— by virtue of the Supremacy Clause— requires 
state officials to implement the federal scheme rather than the laws of 
New Jersey.75 Congress does not have the power to direct states to 
regulate their own citizens.76 By its terms, PASPA does not outlaw 
sports wagering activity, but rather it prevents states from making 
sports wagering legal.77 While Congress is permitted to restrict the 
behavior of a state,78 New Jersey is not proposing to run any sports 
betting operations itself.79 The State even acknowledges that 
prohibiting “only State-run or State-sponsored sports betting” would 
be consistent with New York v. United States, and suggests an alternate 
construction of the statute to limit its prohibition to such State-run 
schemes.80 
 
74  505 U.S. 144 (1992). The essence of the “anti-commandeering  principle” is 
that if Congress directs state legislatures to act in a certain way, the usual recourse 
that exists in the democratic system is taken away from the citizens of the state in 
question. For example, if the citizens of New Jersey supported legal sports betting by 
a two-to-one majority, but the state legislature disagreed, voters would subsequently 
have the opportunity to remove from office those with whom they disagreed and 
replace them with pro- sports betting state legislators. Such recourse is unavailable at 
the national level. Frank Lautenberg and Robert Menendez are but two of one 
hundred members of the Senate, and New Jersey’s twelve Representatives, although 
one of the largest delegations in the House, leave 423 seats for which the citizens of 
New Jersey do not vote. 
75  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-2 (West 2012). 
76  New York, 505 U.S. at 188. 
77  See 28 U.S.C.A. § 3702 (West 1992) (“It shall be unlawful for a governmental 
entity to sponsor, operate . . . betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based . . . on 
one or more competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes 
participate. . . .”). 
78  Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000). 
79  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-2 (West 2012). 
80  Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, No. 3:12-cv-04947, 2012 WL 6020639, at *1, 
II(A)(1)(3) (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2012) (hereinafter “Defendants’ Cross-Motion”). 
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B. Commerce Clause 
The “Applicability” section of PASPA creates a number of very 
specific exceptions to the blanket prohibition on sports betting.81 In 
fact, these exceptions were expressly contemplated to exempt the 
four states to which they apply, as well as potentially New Jersey.82 New 
Jersey rests its Commerce Clause arguments on the idea that there 
exists a “fundamental principle that all the States enjoy equal 
sovereignty.”83 The claim is that PASPA violates this principle because 
it does not target a “local evil” and its “disparate geographic coverage 
is [not] sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”84 Prior to 
enacting PASPA, congressional findings concluded that “[w]ithout 
Federal legislation, sports gambling is likely to spread on a piecemeal 
basis and ultimately develop an irreversible momentum.”85 Per New 
Jersey’s arguments, this finding tends to demonstrate that Congress 
did not consider sports wagering a purely local evil. New Jersey argues 
that the kind of “grandfathering” undertaken by PASPA is generally 
only permitted to assist with incremental reforms, rather than 
existing permanently to treat states differently.86 As a result, the 
precedent set by PASPA could be extended by Congress to limit any 
form of business or manufacturing to states in which it already takes 
place.87 The Supreme Court has apparently abandoned the idea that 
there is a uniformity requirement within the Commerce Clause, but 
has never expressly held as such.88 
 
81  28 U.S.C.A. § 3704 (West 1992). 
82  138 Cong. Rec. H11,756-02 (daily Ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. William 
Hughes). 
83  Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
84  Id. 
85  S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 5 (1991). 
86  Defendants’ Cross-Motion, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, No. 3:12-
cv-04947, 2012 WL 6020639, at *1, II(B) (quoting Delaware River Basin Comm’n v. 
Bucks Cnty. Water & Sewer Auth., 641 F.2d 1087, 1098 (3d Cir. 1981)). 
87  See Defendants’ Cross-Motion at II(B) (“[N]o principled basis would exist to 
deny Congress the right to similarly limit car manufacturing to Michigan, cigarette 
manufacturing to Virginia, or fish processing to Alaska.”). 
88  Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce 
Power, 91 Va. L. Rev. 249, 324 n.267 (2005). 
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C. Due Process and Equal Protection 
Finally, New Jersey argues that while the Supreme Court has 
declined to acknowledge the Uniformity Requirement, the Court still 
recognizes that the claimed discrimination may be “of such an 
injurious character as to bring into operation the due process clause 
of the Fifth Amendment.”89 PASPA is not a “facially neutral” statute, 
as the exemptions contained within explicitly contemplate the states 
to which they apply.90 As New Jersey argues, what Congress did with 
PASPA was identify an issue that it sought to remedy, and then ban 
the problem behavior solely in the places where it was already 
illegal.91 Such a ban denies New Jersey a substantial amount of 
revenue while four other states enjoy a federally-sanctioned 
monopoly.92 Further, such discrimination by the federal government 
is only permissible “where the ‘statute’s disparate geographic 
coverage is sufficiently related to the problem it targets.’”93 The claim 
here is that the geographic coverage of PASPA is essentially inversely 
related to the problem it targets by banning sports betting exclusively 
in jurisdictions where bans already exist. 
The state claims that there is not even a rational basis for 
believing that the passage of a law permitting sports gambling in New 
Jersey was not injurious to the public interest in 1992, but had 
become so in 2012.94 Rational basis review is a form of scrutiny used 
by the Supreme Court to assess the validity of commercial legislation 
that unfairly discriminates amongst groups of people.95 Although this 
is the most deferential form of scrutiny undertaken by the Supreme 
Court, it is still a standard that must be met by challenged legislation. 
 
89  Defendants’ Cross-Motion at II(C) (quoting Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 14 
(1939)). 
90  138 Cong. Rec. H11,756-02 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. William 
Hughes). 
91  Defendants’ Cross-Motion at II(C). 
92  Id. 
93  Id. (quoting Northwest Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 
193, 203 (2009)). 
94  Id. 
95  U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).  
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IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PASPA 
A. Gambling Laws in the United States Have Consistently Evolved 
from Outright Prohibition to Close and Careful Regulation 
Gambling has existed in various forms since the dawn of human 
history, as people have consistently sought out activities that involve 
risks and rewards.96 Yet throughout most, if not all, of the history of 
the United States there have existed large and passionate movements 
to eliminate it from society.97 As a result, laws and regulations 
concerning gambling in its multitude of forms have evolved 
continuously over the past four hundred years at the local, state, and 
national levels.98 Prior to 1978, Nevada was the only state in which 
casino gaming legally took place.99 As of this writing, legal casino 
gaming exists in thirty-eight of the fifty states.100 In the 1840s and 
1850s, a large number of states banned lotteries that had existed for 
any number of years.101 Even the United States Supreme Court 
weighed in, referring to lotteries as “element[s] that will be 
confessedly injurious to the public morals.”102 Eventually, lotteries 
ceased to exist in the United States until they were revived when New 
Hampshire created a biannual lottery in 1963.103 As of this writing, 
forty three states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands all operate and regulate their own lotteries in at least 
one form.104 
While casino gaming and lotteries have gained prominence and 
 
96  DAVID G. SCHWARTZ, ROLL THE BONES: THE HISTORY OF GAMBLING 5-6 (2006). 
97  Id. at 140-157. 
98  U.S. Gambling Timeline, CAPE COD TIMES, 
http://www.capecodonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070724/CASINO/7
07240303 (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
99  SCHWARTZ, supra note 97, at 427-28. 
100  AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, 2011 AGA SURVEY OF CASINO ENTERTAINMENT 4 
(2011), available at 
http://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/sos/aga-sos-
2011.pdf.   
101  SCHWARTZ, supra note 97, at 150. 
102  Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 357 (1903). 
103  SCHWARTZ, supra note 97 at 387. 
104  Lottery Results, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 
http://www.usa.gov/Topics/Lottery-Results.shtml (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).  
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legal legitimacy in recent decades, PASPA moved the regulation of 
sports wagering in the opposite direction. As described above, each 
form of gambling was at one time similarly situated to the others— 
ruled illegal by many states but available to the public in certain 
others. Then in 1992, before the vast majority of states had the 
opportunity to explore the sports wagering environment, PASPA 
eliminated the practice nationwide.105 As noted by Senator Chuck 
Grassley during the debate over PASPA, the federal ban on sports 
wagering is essentially the only time that the federal government has 
involved itself in the direct regulation of gambling activities.106 
Notwithstanding the historical veracity of Grassley’s statement in 
2013, with the exception of the regulation of gambling on Native 
American lands, the regulation of lotteries, casinos, and racetracks is 
presently carried out on a state-by-state basis, rather than by the 
federal government.107 Independent of the question of whether a 
unique federal ban such as PASPA violates the Tenth Amendment or 
another tenet of the Constitution, it is counterintuitive that 
governmental treatment of sports betting has followed the reverse 
trajectory of other forms of gambling activity. 
B. Sports Betting, Like Narcotics and Alcohol, Becomes Far More 
Lucrative When Illegal 
Despite PASPA’s blanket prohibition on sports wagering, a 1999 
study estimated that as much as $380 billion changed hands in that 
year alone as a result of illegal sports betting.108 In contrast, customers 
wagered $3.45 billion legally at Nevada sports books in 2012.109 
Although no estimate is completely accurate, if illegal sports wagering 
outnumbers legal sports wagering activity in the United States by a 
 
105  Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 3701-3704 
(West 1992). 
106  S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 12 (1992). 
107  AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, 2012 AGA SURVEY OF CASINO ENTERTAINMENT 
11-22 (2012) available at 
http://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/sos/aga_sos_20
12_web.pdf. 
108  AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, Sports Wagering Fact Sheet, 
http://www.americangaming.org/industry-resources/research/fact-sheets/sports-
wagering (last visited Oct. 1, 2012). 
109  Id. 
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factor of over one hundred ten to one, it would appear that PASPA 
has failed. This situation represents an example of an attempt to 
legislate a certain “immoral” behavior in the United States falling well 
short of its intended result of eliminating that behavior.  During 
Prohibition, incredible amounts of money could be made dealing in 
illegal liquor. Since the mid-1960s, the “War on Drugs” has only 
served to make narcotics trafficking more lucrative. And PASPA, 
despite what the major sports leagues would have the public believe, 
actually makes it easier to question the integrity of athletic contests by 
de-regulating sports wagering activity and creating opportunities for 
organized crime to flourish. 
There are numerous examples of violence that emerges from 
the organized crime domination of illegal gambling of all kinds. 
When New York City closed its Off Track Betting parlors in 
December of 2010, crime syndicates across the five boroughs gladly 
stepped in to handle the action.110 In and around South Philadelphia 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, small-time bookmakers often 
outperformed mob-connected bookies to the point where the Scarfo 
crime family attempted to put a stop to their businesses, by force.111 
Crews of thugs employed by the syndicate broke into the home of 
one bookie, duct-taping him to a chair and striking him with a pistol 
repeatedly to “encourage” payment of protection money.112 As the 
dominant force in “underground” activities in the area, the 
Philadelphia mob would not stand for others crowding out their 
business, and since their targets were not likely to go to the police, 
their options were expansive.113 At the other end of the spectrum, one 
well-known bookie in the area earned the nickname “The Gentleman 
Gambler” because it was so out of the ordinary for someone in his 
position to not engage in physical coercion to ensure repayment of 
 
110  Larry McShane, Mob on track to win: With OTB gone, bookies are riding high with 
Belmont Stakes on the horizon, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 5, 2011, available at 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/mob-track-win-otb-bookies-riding-high-
belmont-stakes-horizon-article-1.128694. 
111  SEAN PATRICK GRIFFIN, GAMING THE GAME 42-43 (2011). 
112  Id. at 52. 
113  Id. 
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debts.114 In Chicago, organized crime factions make more money 
from bookmaking operations than from any other source.115 So 
profitable is this business that they will stop at nothing to prevent 
anyone from stealing even miniscule profits from them. For example, 
in one instance, an organized crime faction resorted to blowing up a 
competitor’s van with the competitor inside.116 PASPA, by keeping the 
world of sports betting in the shadows, enables bookies to essentially 
torture clients into paying back debts, and encourages violent 
intimidation tactics between competitors attempting to monopolize 
the trade in a given geographic area. 
The organized crime that thrives as a result of PASPA is the 
modern relative of early twentieth century bootleggers. From 1920 
until 1933, the sale, manufacture, and transportation of alcohol were 
forbidden in the United States.117 Rather than eliminating the 
consumption of alcohol as intended, Prohibition created an 
underground market for alcohol, a supply vacuum into which a 
number of sophisticated criminal enterprises gladly stepped.118 Al 
Capone, arguably the most famous criminal in U.S. history, gained 
every ounce of his fame and fortune by flouting the law brazenly and 
openly.119 Eventually, the situation became so untenable and the ban 
so impractical that the Twenty-First Amendment repealed Prohibition 
on December 5, 1933.120 At this point a small number of bootleggers 
continued in the industry, but a majority left the liquor business 
altogether.121 In fact, one of the most popular— and profitable— 
pursuits of the criminal underworld following Prohibition was the 
gambling racket.122 
In the second half of the twentieth century, a new form of 
 
114  Id. at 45. 
115  Crime Inc.: The Big Business of Illegal Gambling (CNBC television broadcast Dec. 
10, 2009), available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/34039744. 
116  Id. 
117  STEPHEN FOX, BLOOD AND POWER 15-18 (1989). 
118  Id. 
119  Id. at 44-46. 
120  U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
121  FOX, supra note 118, at 52-60. 
122  Id. at 98-104. 
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Prohibition exists against a different caliber of illicit substances. Since 
approximately July 1969, the United States government has engaged 
in a large-scale campaign to eliminate the drug trade both within the 
United States and abroad.123 Despite billions of dollars spent on this 
elusive goal throughout the ensuing four-plus decades, statistics point 
to these efforts being for naught.124 The “War on Drugs” has had an 
effect similar to Prohibition in enhancing the monetary incentive for 
groups of individuals to get into the business of providing illegal 
goods.125 The business has become so lucrative as a result of 
draconian enforcement efforts that groups bearing little to no 
resemblance to the traditional mafia have entered the equation and 
earned themselves a substantial profit while perpetrating horrific acts 
of violence to maintain— and expand— their market share.126 
C. Game-Fixing and Point-Shaving Have Created Huge Scandals 
In Multiple Sports 
In spite of the historical evidence that prohibiting activities only 
makes them more profitable and by extension less honest, the 
plaintiffs in NCAA v. Christie insisted that legal sports wagering would 
harm the integrity of the games they facilitate.127 It would appear that 
they have a perfect example of their theory in Tim Donaghy. 
Donaghy was a National Basketball Association (“NBA”) referee who 
bet on NBA games, including games to which he was personally 
assigned, and additionally provided inside information about games 
to friends who subsequently placed their own bets.128 Donaghy pled 
guilty to two federal conspiracy counts,  and he received a sentence of 
 
123  Timeline: America’s War on Drugs, NPR, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9252490 (last visited Oct. 2, 
2012). 
124  See Eduardo Porter, Numbers Tell of Failure in Drug War, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 4, 2012, 
at B1. 
125  FOX, supra note 118, at 362-66. 
126  Id. at 411-20. 
127  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n v. Christie, No. CV124947, 2012 WL 3171566, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2012). 
128  Alan Schwartz & William K. Rashbaum, N.B.A. Referee Is the Focus of a Federal 
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 21, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/21/sports/basketball/21referee.html?_r=2&ref=
sports&oref=slogin. 
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fifteen months in prison.129 The plaintiffs argued that legalizing sports 
gambling will create more Tim Donaghys.130 On the other hand, if 
sports wagering were legal and completely transparent, it would be 
far easier to monitor and regulate it, forcing any potential Donaghy 
copycats out of the shadows and drastically reducing the danger of 
certain groups of people placing bets on games.131 
Further, the most famous “point-shaving” scandals in U.S. history 
have involved college players— individuals who would require a lower 
monetary incentive to become involved in illicit activity.132 Point 
shaving involves conduct by players (or officials) during a game that 
does not affect the outcome, but alters the margin of victory so that 
the losing team “covers the spread.”133 The two most notorious point 
shaving scandals in U.S. history involved the 1950-51 City College of 
New York (“CCNY”) basketball team and the 1978-79 Boston College 
basketball team.134 Although it is logical to presume that unpaid 
collegiate athletes are more susceptible to the pressures potentially 
exerted by individuals looking to control the outcome of games, it is 
important to view these scandals in the proper context.  Both the 
CCNY135 and the Boston College136 scandals involved local, small-time 
gangsters with personal connections to the players in question. In a 
world where wagering on sports was and is illegal in the jurisdiction 
in which these men resided, the point-shaving schemes they operated 
were an easy way to make a quick buck without any corporate 
competition. 
In February 2013, as NCAA v. Christie awaited a decision by Judge 
 
129  Donaghy Sentenced to 15 Months in Prison in Gambling Scandal, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Jul. 30, 2008), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=3509440. 
130  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n v. Christie, No. CV124947, 2012 WL 3171566, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2012). 
131  E.g. professional athletes (Alex Karras), coaches (Pete Rose) and referees 
(Donaghy). 
132  Jason Goldstein, Note, Take the Money Line: PASPA, Bureaucratic Politics, and the 
Integrity of the Game, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 362, 371-72 (2012). 
133  See SCHWARTZ supra note 99, at 372-73. 
134  See Goldstein, supra note 133, at 371-72. 
135  See Joe Goldstein, Explosion: 1951 Scandals Threaten College Hoops, ESPN (Nov. 
19, 2003), http://espn.go.com/classic/s/basketball_scandals_explosion.html. 
136  United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 73-75 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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Shipp on the motions for summary judgment, match-fixing in 
international soccer suddenly grabbed global headlines.137 Criminal 
syndicates throughout Asia allegedly influenced the outcome of 680 
matches in the years from 2009-2012, including matches as 
prominent as the group stage of the UEFA Champions League.138 
That the world’s most popular sport, and more specifically that 
sport’s most popular annual competition, could be infiltrated in such 
a way is a major story. For the purposes of this Note, the most 
important factor is that the groups fixing these matches are also 
betting on them legally, seemingly undercutting arguments that legal 
betting reduces the risk of match-fixing.139 These criminals place their 
bets in legitimate sports books, mostly located in Manila, which 
eschew regulation in favor of volume, allowing for the kinds of profits 
that make match-fixing a worthwhile risk.140 
D. Open and Well-Regulated Gambling Would Have Inhibited 
Historic “Fixing” Scandals 
In the case of Tim Donaghy, there is no guarantee that he would 
have been prevented from betting on games that he officiated had 
legal gambling existed, but the likelihood that he would have gotten 
away with it for so long is greatly diminished. The overwhelming 
majority of sports wagering that occurs in the United States today is 
 
137  Outside the Lines: Global Soccer Match-Fixing Scandal (ESPN television broadcast 
Feb. 8, 2013), available at 
http://soccernet.espn.go.com/video/espnfc/video?id=1332501&cc=5901. 
138  Id. The UEFA Champions League is a competition featuring the prior year’s 
champions (and second and third place squads, depending on country) from 
domestic leagues across Europe. Each of the thirty-two teams plays a home and away 
series against the other three teams in its “group” and the top two in each group 
advance to a sixteen team bracket featuring similar home and away matches where 
the scores are aggregated to determine who advances. Given the annual presence in 
the competition of the wealthiest and most popular clubs in the world, this 
competition receives an inordinate amount of attention from all corners of the 
globe. 
139  Brett Forrest, All the World is Staged, ESPN THE MAGAZINE, May 28, 2012, 
available at http://espn.go.com/sports/soccer/story/_/id/7927946/soccer-wilson-
raj-perumal-world-most-prolific-criminal-match-fixer-espn-magazine. 
140  Brett Forrest, Surprised by the match-fixing scandal? You shouldn’t be, ESPN FC 
UNITED (Feb. 8, 2013, 9:23 AM), 
http://soccernet.espn.go.com/blog/_/name/espnfcunited/id/3254?cc=5901.  
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under the table.141 PASPA’s ban on sports wagering creates a serious 
monetary incentive for individuals or groups to facilitate illicit 
gambling by members of the general public, as the demand remains 
as high as ever and the risk creates premium prices for the service. 
Furthermore, this world of neighborhood bookies and cash 
transactions is incredibly difficult for law enforcement to track.142 
Conversely, wagering done at Las Vegas sports books, casinos, and 
racetracks is subject to an incredible amount of scrutiny.143 Large wins 
always garner some kind of inquiry into their legitimacy, even when 
accomplished by someone who is expected to win.144 Las Vegas sports books 
are also reluctant to accept inordinately large wagers, and are known 
to lower their limits and engage every ounce of their surveillance 
might on those who place wagers of even four figures.145 Concededly, 
Michael Konik’s account of his time “running money” for a big time 
gambler shows exactly how individuals with enough resources can get 
around these limitations. Yet Konik’s story also makes clear just how 
quickly suspicion fell on him simply because of the amount of money 
he wagered at a given time, despite the fact that he was employed 
specifically to reduce suspicion.146 The suspicion Konik received rose 
and fell proportionally with his successes and failures, which hovered 
 
141  NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N REPORT 2-14 (1999), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/finrpt.html. 
142  SEAN PATRICK GRIFFIN, GAMING THE GAME xxv, xxvi (2011). In fact, the FBI 
only caught on to Donaghy after a probe of the Gambino crime family directed them 
to professional gambler Jimmy Battista, a high school classmate of Donaghy’s and 
one of the men to whom Donaghy passed information. 
143  See generally MICHAEL KONIK, THE SMART MONEY (2006) (detailing a multi-year 
association between gambling journalist Konik and a consortium of big-money 
gamblers who used men like Konik to place their bets because of the casino’s 
reticence to accept certain high-volume players’ money). 
144  Poker star Phil Ivey wins $11.5 million, but casino refuses to pay, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 
10, 2012), http://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-phil-ivey-london-
casino-refuses-to-pay-20121010,0,6445151.story. Phil Ivey is likely the most famous 
poker professional in the world today and the most successful player of the 21st 
Century, but wins in certain large amounts are still subject to intense scrutiny in the 
highly-regulated betting parlors of Las Vegas and the United Kingdom. 
145  See KONIK, supra note 144 at 28, 29. It is worth noting that Michael Konik had 
no connections to game-fixing or point shaving, could not have won more than 60 
percent of his bets overall, and often had several exceptionally poor runs at picking 
games, yet the casinos still took considerable steps to curtail his behavior. 
146  KONIK, supra note144 at 29. 
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around fifty-five percent.147 While it is completely accurate to say that 
game fixing still could exist in a world with widespread legal sports 
betting, these examples— and others below— show that legalization, 
regulation, and scrutiny make that risk exceedingly minimal. 
Also instructive to consider is the personality of today’s big-time 
legal gambler. The individuals who engage in the high-stakes 
wagering that Las Vegas casinos fear are supremely competitive, but 
they are not the type of people that attempt to win at all costs.148 
Rather, these individuals want to win as a result of being the best at 
what they do and by being smarter than everyone else, motivations 
that carry a certain amount of inherent integrity.149 The big time legal 
sports bettor sees himself as no different from a hedge fund 
manager— which may not be the best argument for integrity— 
attempting to predict which sides will make the most money and 
trusting that research, skill, and exploiting market inefficiency result 
in winnings that exceed losses.150 
Another important consideration is the difficulty of fixing a 
game or shaving points in today’s high-compensation— and 
information-saturated— sporting environment. The most famous 
game-fixing scandal of all time involved the 1919 Chicago White Sox 
“throwing” the World Series against the Cincinnati Reds.151 Gangster 
Arnold Rothstein paid eight members of the White Sox $10,000 each 
to allow the Reds to win.152 Despite being the far superior team based 
upon both talent and that season’s performance, the White Sox fell 
to the Reds five games to three.153 The two best players on the White 
 
147  See KONIK, supra note 144. Given the “vig” charged by sports books to ensure 
that they remain profitable, an individual needs to win 55 percent of the time to 
break even. 
148  But c.f. id. with 60 Minutes: Sports Betting: Billy Walters (CBS television broadcast 
Jan. 16, 2011) (available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7253011n). 
Although Michael Konik changed the names of the individuals portrayed in his 
book, it is widely believed that Billy Walters is the real-life identity of “Big Daddy Rick 
Matthews”, the main character in Konik’s memoir. 
149  Id.  
150  Id. 
151  SCHWARTZ, supra note 97, at 339. 
152  Id. 
153  Id. 
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Sox, Ed Cicotte and Joe Jackson, who were both involved in the 
scandal, each made $6,000 per year.154 By involving themselves in 
Rothstein’s plot, the two best players on the team— individuals who 
are arguably essential if one wants to be certain of influencing the 
outcome of a best-of-nine series— nearly doubled their yearly 
salaries.155 In contrast, the eight lowest-paid players on the 2012 World 
Series champion San Francisco Giants each made between $480,000 
and $483,000.156 Legal sports books are loath to permit wagers higher 
than $55,000 on a single professional game.157 As this $55,000 limit 
would only net a profit of $50,000 if successful, and such limits are 
often merely academic and are lowered dramatically once someone 
dares to approach them, it would simply not be cost-effective for 
gamblers to pay eight U.S. professional athletes— especially the 
higher-compensated and higher-profile players necessary to a 
successful fix— a sufficient amount of money to induce them to 
throw away the opportunity of winning a championship. 
As far as college athletics are concerned, the Boston College and 
CCNY situations are easily contrasted with the experience of the 
University of Nevada-Las Vegas (“UNLV”) basketball program. 
Although constantly under investigation by the NCAA for violations— 
real and alleged— of rules governing recruiting and the amateur 
status of student-athletes, and once the subject of a federal probe 
 
154  Paul D. Stoudohar, Baseball’s Changing Salary Structure, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS (Fall 1997).Compensation and Working Conditions Fall 1997 at 3, 
available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/baseballs-changing-salary-
structure.pdf. 
155  The World Series operated under a best-of-nine format at that time, but is 
currently best-of-seven. 
156  San Francisco Giants Salary/Payroll Information-2012, ESPN, 
http://espn.go.com/mlb/team/salaries/_/name/sf/san-francisco-giants  (last 
visited Month XX, 201X). 
157  See KONIK, supra note 144, at 22, 23. This figure was simply Konik’s experience 
with two major Las Vegas sports books, and almost exclusive wagering on 
professional football. If sports wagering were legal in New Jersey, a state where four 
professional teams play— and eleven more play within 30 miles of its borders— it is 
reasonable to believe that scrutiny would be even higher and limits even lower, 
especially for sports where individual players have more influence, such as basketball, 
or directly determine whether the opposing team scores, such as soccer and ice 
hockey. 
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regarding connections to a known game-fixer, UNLV has never been 
connected by concrete evidence to gambling activity or point 
shaving.158 This example should show how legal and highly regulated 
sports wagering eliminates the market for nefarious individuals who 
possess the proclivity to alter the outcome of games to stay in 
business. 
The mere fact that UNLV is permitted to compete in 
intercollegiate athletics underscores the hypocrisy of the NCAA in 
signing on to the lawsuit against New Jersey. The NCAA does 
maintain a policy preventing states, where single-game betting is 
legal, from hosting any part of a national championship, but any 
injury that the organization claims in the instant lawsuit is fallacious 
in light of the continued existence of the UNLV athletic program. 
Moreover, the NCAA has permitted repeated iterations of the 
Mountain West Conference Men’s Basketball Tournament and 21 
(and counting) annual “Las Vegas Bowls” to take place in Las 
Vegas.159 The existence of these long-standing events, plus the 
addition of the 2013 and 2014 Pacific-12 Conference Men’s 
Basketball Tournaments in the heart of Sin City completely 
contradict the arguments made in the instant lawsuit.160 If the NCAA 
would suffer a concrete and particularized injury in New Jersey, how 
has it not suffered such injury to this point in Nevada? 
The international soccer scandal is slightly more vexing in light 
of the fact that the criminal syndicates engaging in match-fixing place 
their bets legally. But the atmosphere in which these bets are placed 
is a far cry from the pervasive regulatory scheme that undoubtedly 
would be a part of legalized sports betting in New Jersey. This chaotic 
culture allows individuals to place massive wagers, as well as fix and 
bet on matches in the third or fourth division of obscure nations not 
 
158  Greg Garber & Kory Kozak, Twenty years later, UNLV still indignant, ESPN (Apr. 
1, 2010), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/tournament/2010/columns/story?id=5045144.  
159  Bowl Facts, LAS VEGAS BOWL, http://www.lvbowl.com/facts.php. 
160  See Chris Dufresne, Conference tournaments take their chances in Las Vegas, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/12/sports/la-sp-0313-
pac-12-basketball-gambling-20130313. 
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known for footballing prowess, all without arousing much 
suspicion.161 The obscurity of the vast majority of the supposedly fixed 
matches is the perfect cover, but would be unavailable to gamblers 
within the United States. Primarily, although soccer’s popularity has 
been on the rise in the United States for decades, it is likely that 
wagering options on the sport would be seriously limited. As Michael 
Konik’s experiences again exemplify, both the most popular— i.e., 
Super Bowl— and least popular— soccer, tennis, small-time college 
football— events have lower betting limits and are subject to more 
scrutiny before a single wager is placed.162 If an individual walked into 
the hypothetical future sports book at Monmouth Park Raceway and 
attempted to wager even $5,000 on a USL PRO— the third division of 
professional soccer in the United States— match between the 
Rochester Rhinos and the Harrisburg City Islanders, there would be 
an immediate inquiry and any foul play would most certainly be 
uncovered. 
V. CONGRESS SHOULD REPEAL PASPA OR REVISE THE BAN TO 
ALLOW NEW JERSEY TO MOVE FORWARD 
A. New Jersey’s Constitutional Challenges— Already Denied 
Once— Do Not Appear Destined For Success 
On February 28, 2013, Judge Michael Shipp granted the 
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, enjoining implementation 
of New Jersey’s proposed sports betting regulations.163 Judge Shipp 
reasoned that PASPA is an appropriate use of the Commerce Power, 
that it does not force New Jersey to act in a certain way, and that 
Congress had a rational basis to enact PASPA in the way that it did.164 
On September 17, 2013, a panel of the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed Judge Shipp’s grant of summary judgment to the 
 
161  See Forrest, supra note 141. 
162  KONIK, supra note 144. 
163  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551,  
(D.N.J. 2013) aff'd sub nom. NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
164  Id. at *2. 
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sports league plaintiffs by a vote of 2-1.165 
Regarding New Jersey’s Commerce Clause arguments, the state 
puts itself at a disadvantage by relying on an argument that does not 
appear to have been accepted by the Supreme Court since 1923.166 
However, if New Jersey’s interpretation of the uniformity concept is 
accurate, and the idea is merely dormant rather than explicitly 
rejected, one would think that they could have a few sympathetic ears 
on the Supreme Court. The argument for a uniformity requirement 
is one rooted in an analysis of the Framers’ intent.167 Thus, even 
someone with a perfunctory understanding of the Court’s current 
composition could make the educated guess that there are at least a 
few justices who would be open to any legal theories—grounded in 
legitimate precedent, of course—that would limit Congress’ power 
under the Commerce Clause. Although scholars proposing to revisit 
the uniformity principle concede that such an interpretation is not 
wholly consistent with Justice Scalia’s brand of originalism, it is not 
outlandish to think that these arguments would get the attention of 
Justice Scalia and others.168 
As economic legislation, a review of PASPA on equal protection 
grounds would likely be rational basis review.169 Yet as New Jersey’s 
brief reminds us, “[t]hough the rational basis test is deferential, it ‘is 
not a toothless one.’”170 In fact, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme 
Court asserted that it has “never held that moral disapproval, without 
any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the 
Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates among 
groups of persons.”171 The stated purpose of PASPA is to curtail sports 
betting in this country because such behavior “threatens to change 
 
165  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013). 
166  See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923). 
167  Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce 
Power, 91 VA. L. REV. 249, 263-88 (2005). 
168  Id. at 302-08. 
169  United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). 
170  Defendants’ Cross-Motion, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, No. 3:12-
cv-04947, 2012 WL 6020639, at *1 II(C) (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2012) (quoting Matthews v. 
DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976)). 
171  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538, 582 (2003). 
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the nature of sporting events from wholesome entertainment for all 
ages to devices for gambling.”172 The Senate report makes clear that 
there is a heavy dose of morality behind the push to ban sports 
betting.173 Congress’ desire to cure what it believed to be a moral evil 
may not, under established precedent, justify discriminating against 
the state of New Jersey in its desire to raise revenue, while permitting 
the very same activity to go on unfettered in Nevada. 
Although the “equal footing” arguments put forth by New Jersey 
have not gained traction, the Tenth Amendment arguments have not 
fallen on deaf ears. Although these arguments were not successful on 
appeal, Judge Thomas Vanaskie wrote a dissenting opinion in which 
he posited that PASPA is unconstitutional because it impermissibly 
commandeers the New Jersey state government for federal 
purposes.174 The text of PASPA’s prohibition can be interpreted as 
telling state legislatures how to legislate, but the plain meaning of the 
statute is more suggestive of an outright prohibition of a specific 
activity.175 Judge Vanaskie points out that all other forms of gambling 
activity are presently— and for most of history have been— regulated 
by individual states, which would mean that the federal government 
has intruded on an area traditionally reserved for the states.176 
Because other forms of gambling are governed by state law, the 
average person is likely to believe that sports betting is so governed.177 
Thus, if citizens possess a strong desire for legal sports betting— and 
the 2011 referendum says that they do— it stands to reason that they 
would take out their frustrations on state legislators who are 
“denying” them such an opportunity. This would insulate federal 
legislators from the consequences of passing an unpopular law, which 
is the essence of the Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering 
jurisprudence.178 New Jersey would have a stronger argument if 
 
172  S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1991). 
173  Id. 
174  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 730 F.3d at 241.   
175  28 U.S.C.A. 3702 (West 1992). 
176  NCAA v. Christie, 730 F.3d at 241 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting). 
177  Id. at 246. 
178  Id. 
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PASPA required state and local authorities to enforce its terms,179 
rather than the FBI,180 but Judge Vanaskie’s point is well taken. 
Moreover, as Judge Vanaskie writes, the language of PASPA 
specifically prohibits states from licensing sports betting operations, 
rather than simply prohibiting sports betting.181 PAPSA’s directive to 
refrain from acting is no different from requiring states to act in a 
certain way, which was ruled unconstitutional in New York and 
Printz.182 There is no federal regulatory scheme governing sports 
betting that preempts state regulation, but instead PASPA “set federal 
parameters as to how states may regulate sports gambling.”183 
B. How New Jersey Stands To Gain 
Although New Jersey faces an uphill battle in its attempt to 
declare PASPA unconstitutional, the arguments are there. Judge 
Vanaskie feels that PASPA impermissibly commandeers state 
apparatus to fulfill the will of Congress, and with the possibility that 
other states will follow New Jersey’s example, the Supreme Court may 
want to consider this issue. Yet, regardless of the constitutionality of 
PAPSA, Congress should utilize PASPA’s newfound publicity to 
examine just how practical and necessary the ban actually is. The 
history of laws governing other forms of gambling, as well as the 
prohibition of alcohol and the “War on Drugs” have shown that 
permission in conjunction with close regulation destroys the 
incentives for illegal activity. 
If one divides the $388 billion estimate— the amount of money 
believed to be wagered illegally each year— by forty-six— the number 
of states where sports wagering is presently illegal— it can be 
estimated that New Jersey sports books would see approximately $8.4 
billion wagered annually.184 It is unlikely that such a figure is wholly 
 
179  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
180  See generally SEAN PATRICK GRIFFIN, GAMING THE GAME (2011) (detailing the FBI 
investigation that resulted in the conviction of Tim Donaghy). 
181  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 730 F.3d at 245(Vanaskie, J., 
dissenting). 
182  Id. 
183  Id. at 249. 
184  Sports Wagering Fact Sheet, AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, 
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accurate, given that it represents a 300 percent increase over what is 
annually wagered in Las Vegas, but it is the best estimate that can be 
made from data that presently exists.185 Further, New Jersey’s 
proximity to New York City, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, 
D.C., and Boston does provide a much larger pool of avid sports fans 
and potential bettors than the population centers within a similar 
radius of Las Vegas. If it is an accurate estimate, one can expect gross 
revenue for New Jersey sports books to be around $412.3 million 
annually, based on the fact that Nevada sports books generate 
revenue at around 4.9 percent of the total amount wagered.186 New 
Jersey’s current tax rate on “gross gaming revenue”— the amount a 
casino earns as revenue after paying guest winnings— is 8 percent, 
with an additional option of a 1.25 percent community investment 
alternative or a 2.5 percent investment alternative.187 The original 
sports wagering bill states that sports wagering revenues will be 
subject to both the 8 percent tax and the 1.25 percent community 
investment alternative.188 Nine and one-fourth percent of $412.3 
million yields estimated annual tax revenue for the state of New 
Jersey of $38.1 million. This figure would represent a 13.7 percent 
increase over 2011 New Jersey tax revenues from gaming.189 These 
numbers take on added importance in light of the fact that state 
income from casino taxes in New Jersey dropped by 9.6 percent in 
fiscal year 2011 compared to fiscal year 2010.190 Further, the 
regulations published by the state as of October 15, 2012, would 
 
http://www.americangaming.org/industry-resources/research/fact-sheets/sports-
wagering (last visited October 1, 2012). 
185  Id. 
186  Id.   
187  AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, 2012 AGA SURVEY OF CASINO ENTERTAINMENT,  
19 (2012), available at 
http://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/sos/aga_sos_20
12_web.pdf. 
188  A.B. 4385, 214th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. Nov. 28, 2011) (Statement). 
189  See AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, 2012 AGA SURVEY OF CASINO 
ENTERTAINMENT 19 (2012) available at 
http://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/sos/aga_sos_20
12_web.pdf. New Jersey’s 2012 “Gaming Tax Revenue” was $277.60 million, down 
from $305.50 million in 2011. 
190  OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES, 2012 REVENUE SNAPSHOT 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/budget/FY12_Year_End_Final.pdf. 
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require locations that apply for licenses to pay a $50,000 registration 
fee, as well as a continued “resubmission fee” of $50,000 every five 
years.191 As there are twelve casinos in Atlantic City and four 
racetracks that are eligible for licenses, New Jersey stands to gain up 
to $800,000 in these fees in 2014, 2019, 2024, and beyond, with a 
certain percentage of that money going towards compulsive gambling 
treatment and prevention programs.192 As small as these numbers 
appear in the context of New Jersey’s 2012 budget of $31.7 billion,193 
it would help to close the 6.8 percent gap between New Jersey’s 2011 
and 2012 budgets.194 Legal sports betting in New Jersey will provide a 
significant economic benefit to the state, a major reason why 
Governor Christie is such a staunch supporter of the measure. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Given recent developments in potentially expanding the legality 
of internet gaming, Congress would be well-served by examining the 
inconsistency of gambling regulation in this country. Whether it is re-
opening the grace period to allow New Jersey to pass appropriate 
legislation, or opening the possibility of legal sports betting in all 50 
states, any move to cut back on PASPA’s prohibition would allow for 
an increase in revenue for the affected states with minimal downside 
if enacted appropriately. The potential developments in this saga 
should have Federalism scholars— not to mention sports fans and 
wise guys across New Jersey— paying rapt attention for years to come. 
 
 
191  Donald Wittkowski, Final regulation approved for sports betting in New Jersey, THE 
PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, Oct. 16, 2012 
192  Id. 
193  Kate Zernike, Christie Signs Budget, but Also Vetoes Pieces, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 30, 
2012 at A18. 
194  Id. 
